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11 January 88

TO: Mr. Ivo Spalatin
House Foreign Affairs Committee
2401-A Rayburn Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Ivo:

Here are the reports that were mentioned.

Have a good trip.

House Branch
Office of Congressional Affairs

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THE CURRENT DIGEST OF THE SOVIET PRESS

Volume XXXIX, No. 28

August 12, 1987

New 'Flexibility' in Soviet Foreign Policy

PRIMAKOV CITES NEED TO BALANCE SPENDING ON ECONOMY, MILITARY; POLITICAL MEANS (ARMS CUTS), 'COMMON-SENSE' CONCESSIONS ARE IMPORTANT IN GAINING SECURITY; NO EXPORT OF REVOLUTION

A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF FOREIGN POLICY. (By Academician Ye. Primakov. *Pravda*, July 10, p. 4. Complete text:) 1.—One can frequently hear it said: From the first days of Soviet power, our country has been struggling for peace among peoples—what kind of new approaches, and, especially, what kind of new foreign-policy philosophy can one talk about, when peace remains the main goal of the USSR's foreign policy?

The continuity of the Soviet state's foreign-policy line is indisputable, of course. But all the same, at present qualitatively new conditions, as M. S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has repeatedly emphasized, make it necessary—perhaps more insistently necessary than at any earlier time in our history—to treat a whole series of key problems of international life in an innovative way.

As the world approached the 1980s, it was rapidly losing faith in the inconvertibility of its long-held perspective. The problem of survival, which had existed before this as well, was now posed acutely as the problem of preserving human civilization from inevitable destruction in the event of a thermonuclear war.

Relatively recently, we still said—and not only said but were certain of it—that if the imperialist forces committed aggression against us, they would be consumed in the flames of the war they had kindled. In the past, this conclusion had every right to existence. Its function in giving warning to a potential aggressor was obvious, but perhaps the main thing consisted in the mobilizing power of such a statement: It pointed to the need for increasing fighting efficiency as virtually the only means of maintaining the country's security at the proper level.

Comparatively recently, we considered peaceful coexistence a respite that would be cut short by those who again would try to strangle the first country of victorious socialism. This situation also insistently dictated the requirement for an increase in fighting efficiency, once again as virtually the only means of ensuring the country's security.

Today such assessments and interpretations are clearly insufficient and inaccurate. While maintaining the great importance of improving its defense capability, the Soviet Union is bringing to the fore political means of ensuring its security. We are operating in a fundamentally new situa-

tion: With the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction in such quantities and of such high quality, there can be no victors in a thermonuclear war. Thus, peaceful coexistence is becoming a vital requirement for the survival of mankind. Isn't it natural for such a situation to insistently demand not only new methods of carrying out foreign policy, especially for the great powers, but also a fundamentally new philosophy of approaching international problems?

But why did this indisputable, correct idea begin to materialize intensively in our country only after the April (1985) plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee? It must be admitted that the experience of preceding development, when we sometimes used the epithet "historic" in vain, is by no means conducive to the setting of new "historic landmarks." However, in this case the matter at hand is not an artificially designated but a real Rubicon, from which a radical qualitative change began in the USSR's domestic and foreign practice alike.

Perhaps the organic link between our country's domestic policy and its foreign policy has never before been as manifest as it is today. After the April plenary session, a course was set aimed at the acceleration of the economic, social and political development of the Soviet Union. The

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FBIS-SOV-87-245
22 December 1987

ANNEX

Zhurkin article

'Reasonable Sufficiency' Concept Assessed
AU181551 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 12 December 1987
[Signed to Press 18 Nov 87] pp 11-21
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[Article by V.V. Zhurkin, S.A. Karaganov, and A.V. Kortunov: "On a Reasonable Sufficiency"—boldfaced passages as published]

[Text] The concept of a reasonable sufficiency, which represents one of the most important elements in the new political thinking, is achieving recognition wherever people attempt to perceive and evaluate the contemporary critical period in the development of international relations and all human civilization, and to find ways and means of averting a nuclear catastrophe. This concept is increasingly appearing as the foundation for a rational approach to halting the arms race, which has gone beyond all conceivable bounds. Can the accumulation of more than 50,000 nuclear warheads on our planet, or the total numbers in states' standing armies in peacetime, which is close to 30,000,000, really be considered reasonable or sufficient?

Of course, the arms race has its own logic of development, its own criteria of rationality. If one works according to these principles, one can not only substantiate the expediency of maintaining present military potentials but also prove the need for further buildups of them. The concept of reasonable sufficiency is in fact intended to break up the closed logic of the arms race, to overcome the speculative scholastic nature of many contemporary military doctrines and concepts, and to place the discussion of military problems in a broad political, economic, and social context.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency is not a possession monopolized by any one state or political party. The very fact that similar ideas are simultaneously being voiced by U.S. antiwar movement activists, by the leaders of a number of developing countries, by the state and party leadership of the PRC, and by the governments of neutral European states, speaks of the fact that the problem of new approaches to military activity became ripe long ago and urgently requires a solution. At the same time, the most significant and radical steps to assert reasonable sufficiency in the theory and practice of international relations are being undertaken by the USSR.

This concept was put forward during CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's visit to France in the fall of 1985 (Footnote 1) (M.S. Gorbachev: "Selected Speeches and Articles." Moscow, 1985, p 313), substantiated in the CPSU Central Committee Report to the 27th party congress (Footnote 2) (Documents of the 27th CPSU Congress. Moscow, 1986, p 67), and was then developed in a number of authoritative statements and speeches by Soviet leaders. The idea of reasonable sufficiency has also been reflected in the collective

documents of the socialist countries, specifically in the Budapest (1986) statement by the Political Consultative Council of Warsaw Pact member states, and in the document entitled "On the Military Doctrine of Warsaw Pact Member States" signed in May 1987 in Berlin. The article by USSR Minister of Defense D.T. Yazov entitled "The Warsaw Pact's Military Doctrine — a Doctrine of Defending Peace and Socialism" is of great importance for the establishment of the concept of reasonable sufficiency in contemporary military-political thinking. (Footnote 3) (PRAVDA, 27 July 1987)

It is natural that promotion of the concept of reasonable sufficiency presupposes attempts to give it a concrete form and to provide answers to questions about the place of reasonable sufficiency both in states' joint efforts to consolidate international security and reduce arms, and in each state's foreign political strategy; and also to answer questions of the criteria for sufficiency and rationality, and of effective methods of weaving them into the fabric of international relations today and in the future. This article is an attempt to come closer to an understanding of certain concrete aspects of reasonable sufficiency.

Has there been any historical experience of the application of the principle of reasonable sufficiency to the nuclear age in the period since World War II? It would seem that there has been such experience, although it was fragmentary, limited in its consequences, and inadequately thought out as a concept.

The first successful efforts in the attempt to set limits to the buildup of nuclear arsenals were the well-known Soviet-American SALT I and SALT II Treaties and agreements on strategic arms limitations. The ABM Treaty, which still remains a powerful obstacle in the way of "Star Wars," has played an exceptionally important role in preventing an arms race in space for over a decade. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international acts aimed at curbing nuclear weapons are of intransient significance.

The history of the postwar period has also provided examples of significant unilateral steps undertaken by our country in particular. It is enough to mention the radical reduction in numbers of the Soviet Armed Forces at the end of the fifties under conditions in which the USSR had not yet achieved military parity with the United States. Other countries, too, have provided examples of unilateral measures. Thus, the PRC is unilaterally cutting its Armed Forces by 1 million people. Consequently, there is indeed experience of unilateral measures aimed at sufficiency.

Historical experience attests to the possibility of both multilateral and unilateral measures. But it also speaks of something else: The efforts made so far have not been enough to halt the arms race. This gives rise to a need for a new, concentrated, large-scale approach aimed at a

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SUBJECT: f/akhromeyev article 1of6

KEYWORDS:

akhromeyev, article, nov 87, ic

COMMENTS:

Akhromeyev's article on doctrinal issues, part 1 of 6. Hard line.

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BODYSUBJ

TAKE 1 OF 6--USSR JOURNAL ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE

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MOSCOW PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA IN RUSSIAN NO. 12, DEC

87 (SIGNED TO PRESS 6 NOV 87) PP 23-28

(((ARTICLE BY MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION SERGEY FEDOROVICH AKHROMEYEV, MEMBER OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHIEF-OF-GENERAL STAFF OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES, AND USSR FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE: "THE DOCTRINE OF PREVENTING WAR, DEFENDING PEACE AND SOCIALISM"--PASSAGES WITHIN SLANTLINES PUBLISHED IN BOLDFACE)))

((TEXT)) THE DOCUMENT "ON THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE WARSAW PACT MEMBER STATES," ADOPTED AT THE BERLIN CONFERENCE (FOOTNOTE 1) (HELD IN MAY 1987) OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, HAS GENERATED A BROAD RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC. AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. TODAY THE NUCLEAR DANGER THREATENS EVERYONE. SURVIVAL IN THE NUCLEAR-SPACE AGE HAS BECOME THE MAIN TASK OF ALL MANKIND. THEREFORE, A DECISIVE SHIFT TO A POSITION OF THE NEW POLITICAL THINKING IS NO LESS IMPORTANT IN THE MILITARY SPHERE THAN IN POLITICS. IT IS TIME TO COMPLETELY RENOUNCE OUTDATED VIEWS ON THE PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY; TO OVERCOME THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF "NUCLEAR DETERRENCE," ON WHICH THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO BLOC IS STILL BASED; TO REMOVE THE MUTUAL SUSPICION AND MISTRUST THAT HAS ACCUMULATED OVER MANY DECADES; AND TO ACHIEVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS AND INTENTIONS.

IT IS PRECISELY THIS THAT THE ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAD IN MIND IN DECIDING TO PROMULGATE THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, WHICH IS THE

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